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Abstract
A survey conducted in Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska elicited producers’ pref-
erences for various farm policy changes. This permitted examination of the diversity of 
preferences that single-state studies have not allowed. Five policy choices, including defi-
ciency payments, loan programs, crop insurance, export programs, and disaster payments 
were examined. Logit model results predicting producer preferences for each of the five 
dichotomous policy choices are reported. Explanatory variables based on expected utility 
theory such as risk aversion, price and yield variability, and price–yield correlation are sig-
nificant in various models. 
There are often intense debates about the future direction of farm policy. As 
Congressional leaders and the Administration continue to seek solutions to con-
cerns expressed by producers and their representative organizations, they are 
often confronted by divergent and even contradictory messages from various 
regions and producer groups. Because alternative policies have potentially dis-
similar economic implications for producers, their preferences could logically be 
derived from an economic evaluation of the various alternatives. The research re-
ported in this paper follows the vein of literature that has investigated producer 
policy preferences at various points in time. Past agricultural policy surveys in-
clude Barkley and Flinchbaugh; Edelman and Lasley; Kastens and Goodwin; Ora-
zem, Otto, and Edelman; and Zulauf, Guither, and Henderson. 
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Scrimgeour and Passour related preferences for farm policy to the public 
choice literature where self-interest is generally treated as a strong force motivat-
ing individual political preferences. They go on to argue that many factors be-
yond wealth maximization may enter into policy preferences. Given that many 
farm policy options under consideration today involve providing risk protection, 
a natural extension of policy preference analysis consistent with Scrimgeour and 
Passour is to consider policy preferences in an expected utility framework. 
This study explores producers’ preferences for current farm policy options. It 
is commonly observed that these preferences differ by commodity and region. 
U.S. farm policy generally reflects a compromise among these competing inter-
ests, compared with a more decentralized policy structure, such as in Canada. 
However, the causal economic relationships between policy preferences and eco-
nomic context in which producers operate is not always clear. For example, a 
stronger preference for the FAIR Act in the Midwest than in the South during 
the 1996 farm bill debate was reflected in the legislative concessions leading to 
final passage. However, economic factors that underlie producer preferences 
in the various regions are not clear. By capturing variables that characterize the 
economic context of respondents, we provide insights into the basis for partic-
ular policy preferences. A better understanding of the underlying causes of pol-
icy preference may lead to a clearer dialogue with respect to formulation of fu-
ture farm policy. In particular, we examine the economic characteristics of those 
producers who favor and disfavor the general policy trends of the past decade—
movement away from deficiency payments and toward greater reliance on insur-
ance programs. 
Survey Procedures 
A survey conducted in the spring of 1999 elicited producers’ preferences for 
various farm policy changes. The project objective was to gain a better under-
standing of farmers’ risk management decision making and educational needs. 
The survey was conducted in Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska. Two ma-
jor crops were chosen for particular emphasis in each state: corn and soybeans in 
Indiana and Nebraska; cotton and soybeans in Mississippi; and cotton and grain 
sorghum in Texas.1 
Each state’s Agricultural Statistical Service was contracted to sample from 
their pool of commercial farms. After excluding small noncommercial farms gen-
erating less than $25,000 in gross income, the sample was stratified across four 
categories of gross farm income. Mail surveys were sent to crop producers near 
planting. A follow-up reminder card was sent two weeks following the first mail-
ing and a second mailing was sent to those who had not returned the survey two 
weeks after the postcard reminder. A total of 1,812 questionnaires were returned 
for a response rate of 26.6%. After elimination of nonresponses to particular ques-
tions used in this analysis, 1,350 useable responses were analyzed. 
Producers were asked to compare two policy alternatives and to state their 
preference for one versus the other. Five possible responses were allowed: 
strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or not sure. In this analysis, 
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the responses are collapsed into a binary choice framework. Responses of either 
strongly agree or agree are treated as a positive response to a particular pol-
icy, while responses of disagree, strongly disagree, and not sure are treated as 
a nonpositive response. This approach does not fully reflect the diversity of re-
sponses that might be captured with a multinomial model. However, this ap-
proach allows for a simplicity of interpretation that is confounded by more 
complex models.2 
Policy Choices Examined 
Five policy choices were examined (table 1). First, producers were asked if 
they agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Eliminate transition payments and 
go back to deficiency payments.” This question elicited producers’ preference for 
the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act versus the deficiency payment program that had 
existed prior to 1996. Producers were also asked if they agreed or disagreed with 
“Subsidies should be increased on higher crop insurance coverages, rather than 
increasing the level of catastrophic coverage.” This question was relevant to the 
Congressional debate on crop insurance reform. Catastrophic coverage insurance 
provides a 50% yield guarantee indemnified at 55% of expected price. Subsidies 
for higher crop insurance coverage options were keyed off the value of the cata-
strophic coverage policy. However, the percent subsidy on higher levels of cover-
age declined from 100% on a catastrophic policy. A key provision of crop insur-
ance reform enacted in 2000 was increasing the benefits of the program through 
higher subsidies on buy-up coverage. The impact of this change on producer wel-
fare is still a matter of debate (Skees). 
Producers were also asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the state-
ment, “Raise loan rates rather than increase crop insurance funding.” Much of 
the decline in farm income since 1997 was due to price declines resulting from 
weakened export markets. The 1996 farm bill left the marketing loan program in-
tact, but capped at 1995 levels. Thus, this question elicited producers’ preferences 
for price support through higher marketing loan rates versus increased insurance 
subsidies. 
To elicit preferences between export enhancement programs and domestic 
price supports, producers were asked for agreement or disagreement with the 
statement: “Expand export assistance programs rather than raise loan rates.” This 
question was meant to capture producer preferences for indirect price support 
through a program that increases the foreign demand for U.S. production and 
presumably raises domestic prices versus a program that mitigates the effect of 
low prices by providing payments which make up the shortfall when price falls 
below the loan rate. 
Producers were also asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement, 
“Provide insurance premium subsidies, rather than make disaster payments.” 
This question elicited producer preferences for receiving risk protection in the 
form of insurance subsidized at a higher level rather than disaster payments, 
which have traditionally been offered after a disaster event and on an ad hoc ba-
sis. Producers in all four states were assumed familiar with the choices, given that 
ad hoc disaster payments were made in 1998 through 2000. 
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Table 1. Dependent and independent variables examined 
Dependent Variables  Description 
  Producers were asked how strongly they agree or dis-
agree with the statement: a 
Prefer deficiency payments  Eliminate transition payments and go back to deficiency 
payments. 
Prefer export enhancement  Expand export assistance programs rather than raise loan 
rates. 
Prefer more insurance  Subsidies should be increased on higher crop insurance 
 subsidy   coverages rather than increasing the level of cata-
strophic coverage. 
Prefer increased loan rates  Raise loan rates, rather than increase crop insurance 
funding. 
Prefer insurance premium  Provide insurance premium subsidies, rather than 
 subsidy   make disaster payments. 
Independent Variables  Description 
Total crop acres  Total owned and rented crop acres in the farming opera-
tion in 1999. 
Percent corn  Intended planted corn acres in 1999 divided by the total 
crop acres. 
Percent soybeans  Intended planted soybean acres in 1999 divided by the 
total crop acres. 
Percent cotton  Intended planted cotton acres in 1999 divided by the to-
tal crop acres. 
Percent sorghum  Intended planted sorghum acres in 1999 divided by the 
total crop acres. 
Yield risk  Producers evaluated yield risk on a 5-point scale as to the 
potential effect on their farm income. Five represented 
a high potential to affect farm income. Respondents 
indicating a value of 5 are identified with a dummy 
variable. 
Price risk  Producers evaluated price risk on a 5-point scale as to 
the potential effect on their income. Five represented 
a high potential to affect farm income. Respondents 
indicating a value of 5 are identified with a dummy 
variable. 
Perceives negative   Perceptions of negative farm yield–price correlation 
 yield–price correlation   between farm yield and price were elicited through a 
hypothetical scenario where their farm yield fell 30% 
below average. Respondents were asked whether 
they would expect prices to increase, decrease, or re-
main unchanged given this yield shock. Individu-
als expecting an increase in market price given a low 
yield for either major crop on their farm are indicated 
by a dummy variable. 
(Continued )
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Table 1. Continued 
Independent Variables                Description 
Risk aversion  Producers were asked their willingness to accept a lower 
price to avoid risk on a 5-point agree/disagree scale. 
This question, although couched in terms of price 
risk, is indicative of whether the individual is will-
ing to pay a risk premium. Individuals indicating that 
they agreed or strongly agreed that they were willing 
to accept a lower price risk are indicated by a dummy 
variable. 
Below average income  Survey respondents were asked whether the produc-
er’s farm income in 1998 was below the average of the 
preceding 5 years. 
Percent farm income  Survey respondents were asked what percent of their   
household gross farm income was from farming. 
Percent borrowed  Producers were asked what percent of the total assets 
were used in the farming. 
College education  The college education variable indicates completion of at 
least a 4-year college degree. 
Perceive government  Producers were asked, “In terms of the potential to affect 
 program risk   your farm income, how would you rate changes in 
government programs as a source of risk?” Measured 
on a 5-point scale, a 5 indicated government program 
changes had a strong potential to affect farm income 
and a 1 indicated that they perceive government pro-
gram changes as a low risk. A dummy variable is 
used to indicate the respondent marked either a 4 or 5 
on the 5-point scale. 
Crop insurance purchase  The purchase of buy-up crop insurance is indicated by a 
dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the in-
dividual purchased some form of buy-up crop insur-
ance in 1998. This variable takes a value of zero for all 
individuals who did not purchase crop insurance or 
only purchased the catastrophic coverage policy. 
a Treated as a positive response if the respondent either strongly agreed or agreed. 
Data 
Fifty-six percent of the sample indicated that they would prefer to go back to 
the deficiency payment program (table 2). The second dependent variable, indi-
cating a preference for increased insurance subsidies over increased catastrophic 
coverage, was preferred by 53% of the survey respondents. Of the five dependent 
variables, the lowest level of agreement, 42%, was indicated for the question ask-
ing a preference for increased loan rates rather than increased insurance subsi-
dies. Forty-five percent of producers indicated that they prefer export enhance-
ment to increased loan rates. Fifty-four percent of those responding indicated that 
they would prefer insurance programs to disaster payments. 
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Table 2. Data summary 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Prefer a return to deficiency payments  56.0  50.0  0  100 
Prefer more insurance subsidy to increased 
     catastrophic coverage  53.0  50.0  0  100 
Prefer increased loan rates to increased 
     insurance subsidy  42.0  49.0  0  100 
Prefer Export Enhancement to increased 
     loan rates  45.6  49.7  0  100 
Prefer insurance premium subsidy to 
     disaster payments  54.0  50.0  0  100 
Yield risk  0.44  0.49  0  1.00 
Price risk  0.69  0.46  0  1.00 
Perceives negative yield–price correlation  0.28  0.45  0  1.00 
Risk aversion  0.33  0.47  0  1.00 
1998 income was below 5-year average  0.65  0.48  0  1.00 
Percent of income from farming  73.53  27.62  2  100 
Percent of farm investment borrowed  31.9  28.25  0  99 
College education  0.36  0.48  0  1.00 
Perceive government program risk  0.64  0.48  0  1.00 
Crop insurance purchase  0.53  0.50  0  1.00 
Total crop acres  1,440.4  1,572.7  46  18,000 
Percent corn acres  24.0  23.0  0  97.0 
Percent soybean acres  28.0  27.0  0  96.0 
Percent cotton acres  14.0  25.0  0  99.0 
Percent sorghum acres  3.0  11.0  0  98.0 
The first three independent explanatory variables reflect the perceived poten-
tial for yield and price variability to affect farm income and the correlation be-
tween price and yield. 
The mean values for price and yield variability are both relatively high. 
Slightly more than 44% of respondents indicated yield variability had a high po-
tential to affect their farm income and 69% of respondents indicated price vari-
ability had that potential. 
A negative correlation between market price and farm yield may influence the 
overall risk environment of a firm. For example, a strong negative correlation im-
plies price and yield variations tend to offset each other. There is evidence sug-
gesting that negative correlation may exist in some crops and regions (Heifner 
and Coble; Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes). Twenty-eight percent of respondents 
perceived that there was a negative correlation between the yield of one of their 
crops and market price. 
In an indicator of risk aversion, 33% of respondents were identified as willing 
to accept a lower price to avoid risk on a 5-point agree/disagree scale. This per-
centage is comparable to the previous study by Musser, Patrick, and Eckman that 
elicited similar producer risk preferences. 
The “1998 Income Was Below 5-Year Average” variable was included to in-
dicate whether the producers had recently suffered a farm income loss, making 
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them more sensitive or vulnerable to risks in the current year. Summary statistics 
show that 65% of the respondents had below-average income in 1998. 
One of the commonly recognized approaches to mitigating farm risk is aug-
menting the farm family’s income with off-farm earnings. This has the potential 
to both raise household income and diversify it. Survey respondents were asked 
the percent of household gross farm income from farming. The average value was 
73.5%, with a range from 2 to 100%. 
Percent of total farm investment that is borrowed measures an important as-
pect of financial risk. This information is hypothesized to be an important compo-
nent of characterizing the risk decision-making environment for the farm. Among 
the survey respondents, the mean value was 31.98%. 
The college education variable indicates completion of at least a 4-year college 
degree and serves as an indicator of management training. The summary statis-
tics show that 36% of the individuals responding to the survey had completed a 
4-year college degree. 
Sixty-four percent of the respondents perceive government program risk as 
having significant potential to affect their farm income. The purchase of buy-up 
crop insurance is indicated by a dummy variable. Fifty-three percent of the indi-
viduals in the survey bought some form of buy-up crop insurance. 
Total crop acres was included in the analysis to reflect differences in scale of 
operation. Among the survey respondents, the mean total crop acres was slightly 
more than 1,440 acres. The maximum size was 18,000 acres of cropland. 
The next four variables indicate the percent of total acres planted to a specific 
crop (corn, soybeans, cotton, and sorghum). It is hypothesized that potential dif-
ferences in the economic context of producing different crops may influence pol-
icy preferences. For example, cotton tends to be a high-input and high-cost crop 
compared to soybeans. Of the four crops, soybeans had the highest mean percent-
age value of approximately 28%. Sorghum, which is only analyzed in one state, 
has the lowest mean value of 3%. A maximum value of near 100% indicates that 
some of the participating farms were nearly completely specialized in production 
of each of the crops. 
Results 
The logit model results indicate several significant relationships between eco-
nomic variables and farm policy preferences. For example, the effect of the com-
ponents of revenue variability (yield risk, price risk, and yield–price correlation) 
are related directly to policy preferences. These may be argued to be fundamental 
underlying causes of preferences that have often been characterized as regional 
differences. An understanding that an economic parameter like yield–price cor-
relation may influence policy preference is instructive both because this percep-
tion differs by region and crop and because previous studies of policy preferences 
have generally overlooked such variables. 
Because the parameter estimates in a logit model do not reflect the marginal ef-
fect of a variable as in ordinary least squares models, marginal effects are calcu-
lated and reported. Further, Greene’s recommended approach of calculating the 
marginal effect at every observation is followed. The averages of individual mar-
ginal effects are reported in table 3 and are calculated based on a probability range 
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of 0 to 100%. For discrete explanatory variables, marginal effects are calculated 
as the difference in the probability of preferring the first policy given the dummy 
variable is set equal to one versus zero. 
Likelihood ratio test chi-squared statistics for each of the models are reported 
and all models are strongly significant. A second measure of model performance, 
percent concordance, gives the percent of observations where the predicted and 
observed response agree. The models had a percent concordance ranging from 
60% to 71%. 
The three variables characterizing the components of revenue variability—
price risk, yield risk, and yield–price correlation—are each significant in some 
models. These variables are assumed to reflect the magnitude of risk the pro-
ducer faces and not the degree of risk aversion, which is quantified separately. 
Producers perceiving yield variability as having a significant potential to affect 
them have a 5.2% lower probability of preferring a return to deficiency payments 
and are 13.6% more likely to prefer insurance subsidy to disaster payments. This 
is consistent with wanting relatively more government funding devoted to higher 
insurance protection and relatively less to price protection programs. The impli-
cation is that producers facing relatively greater yield risk are more likely to sup-
port enhanced insurance programs over low-level yield coverage or even the 
price support provided under the previous farm bill. 
Those perceiving a high degree of price risk are 11.6% less likely to prefer in-
surance subsidy over catastrophic coverage, have a 13.2% higher probability of 
preferring increased loan rates to insurance subsidy, and 14.9% higher probabil-
ity of desiring an increase in export programs rather than loan programs. Com-
bining the last two results and the fact that price variability is not significant in 
the “return to deficiency payments” question suggests that those perceiving a 
high degree of price risk want price protection and have a clear preference for 
how it should be achieved. They are not inclined to return to deficiency pay-
ments, or utilize crop insurance (including revenue insurance) for risk protec-
tion. Rather, they support increases in loan programs, but prefer export pro-
grams even more. 
The price–yield correlation variable has a positive effect on the probability 
of preferring insurance to disaster programs and on the preference for export 
programs over increased loan rates. Producers who perceive a negative corre-
lation between price and yield are 5.8% more likely to prefer insurance funding 
over disaster programs. A factor here may be the introduction of revenue insur-
ance. Individuals perceiving negative correlation in price and yields might be 
expected to prefer revenue insurance because revenue indemnities are more re-
flective of their economic losses than yield-triggered disaster payments. Like-
wise, the positive effect of price–yield correlation on the preference for export 
programs versus the loan rate may stem from a recognition that when yield and 
price are correlated, managing only price or yield risk may do a poor job of pro-
tecting revenue. As Miranda and Glauber show, when a negative price–yield 
correlation exists, censoring either price or yield risk individually may do little 
to reduce revenue risk. 
Risk aversion has a significant positive effect on the preference for increased 
insurance subsidy over increased catastrophic coverage, insurance over disas-
ter programs, and export enhancement rather than increasing the loan rate. In 
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all three models, the difference in probability is more than 7%. This suggests that 
risk aversion is positively related to a preference for the high levels of protection 
afforded by buy-up insurance coverage versus the low level of yield protection 
afforded by either catastrophic coverage or disaster programs. 
Producers who realized a below-average farm income in 1998 might be ex-
pected to desire greater government support. Given that the questions posed re-
quire a preference between alternative policies, it was found that this variable 
is positively related to a desire for traditional farm policy mechanisms. Farmers 
who incurred a below average income in 1998 are 7.3% more likely to desire a re-
turn to deficiency payments and 5.3% more likely to prefer increased loan rates 
over insurance subsidy. Farmers incurring a below-average income in 1998 are 
also 4.6% less likely to show a preference for insurance over disaster programs. 
Thus, this group appears least in favor of the policy trends toward Freedom to 
Farm and expanding crop insurance programs. 
The percent of household income from farming is significant in two models. 
This variable has a positive relationship with both a preference for increasing 
loan rates over insurance subsidy and for insurance versus disaster payments. 
The marginal effect of this variable is near 0.09 in both models. This implies that a 
10% increase in the percent of household income coming from farming increases 
the probability by slightly less than 1%. 
While the percent of farm investment that is borrowed often is suggested as 
an important component of the risk characteristics of a farm, it is significant in 
only one of our policy models. It has a positive effect on the probability of prefer-
ring insurance subsidy over catastrophic coverage, with the marginal effect cal-
culated to be 0.12. This implies that a 10% increase in the farm’s percent debt in-
creases the probability of preferring insurance subsidy to increased catastrophic 
coverage by just over 1%. 
The college education variable is significant in all five models and is positively 
associated with the policy trends of the 1990s—toward Freedom to Farm and ex-
panding crop insurance programs. This variable is estimated to have a marginal 
effect of -9.6% in the model of a preference for a return to deficiency payments 
and an effect of -7.0% in the model of preferring increased loan rates to increased 
insurance subsidy. Conversely, college education has a positive effect of 5.3% on 
the probability of preferring insurance subsidy to catastrophic coverage. Sim-
ilarly, this variable has a positive 6.3% effect on the preference for export pro-
grams relative to loan rates and a 5.8% marginal effect in the model of preferring 
insurance subsidy to disaster payments. It is our interpretation of these results 
that college-educated producers are more likely to understand economic relation-
ships and have less confidence in direct government intervention into commod-
ity and risk markets. The college educated perceive deficiency payments, loan, 
and disaster programs negatively, while giving indication that they desire insur-
ance and export programs. Further, the college educated appear to want to obtain 
a level of insurance protection above some free minimal coverage as provided by 
catastrophic insurance and ad hoc disaster programs. 
Producers who perceive government programs as having a high potential to 
affect income tend to prefer a return to deficiency payments, loan rates to insur-
ance subsidy, and are less likely to prefer exports over loan rates. The marginal 
effect is a positive 9.8% on the preference for a return to deficiency payments 
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and a 6.6% increase in the probability of preferring loan rates over insurance 
subsidy. 
Previous purchase of buy-up insurance is consistently related to a preference 
for higher insurance subsidies rather than increased loan rates, disaster programs, 
or greater catastrophic coverage. Having previously purchased crop insurance in-
creases the probability of preferring insurance subsidy to increased catastrophic 
coverage by 27.9%. This variable also has a marginal effect of -9.2% in the model 
of preferring increased loan rates to more insurance and a positive 13.4% effect in 
the insurance versus disaster programs model. These results suggest that those 
who have previously participated in buy-up insurance tend to find it useful, and 
would like to see additional government resources devoted to it. 
Farm size is significant and positive in two of the five models. Given the 
economies of scale in agricultural production and the imposition of payment 
limitations on some government programs, it is not surprising that size would 
influence some preferences. Farms with more crop acres prefer more insurance 
subsidy to increased catastrophic coverage and increased loan rates to more in-
surance subsidy. This suggests larger farms find relatively little value in low-
level insurance coverage and desire the price guarantee provided by loan pro-
grams. The aggregation effect of farm size can be considered in these two 
results. Catastrophic insurance coverage applies to all acres of a crop in which 
an individual has an interest. Higher coverages afford more protection and al-
low subdivision of acres into smaller insurance units. This makes buy-up cover-
age relatively more beneficial than catastrophic coverage to the large producer. 
Again, aggregation may play a role in the preference for price protection over 
insurance subsidy. If, by expanding the scale of operation, a producer becomes 
increasingly spatially diversified, then price risk will become relatively more 
important in comparison to yield risk. 
The percent crop acres variables are each significant in at least one model. Per-
cent of crop acres planted to corn is most often significant—in three of the five 
models. The most intriguing finding is the opposite signs taken by percent corn 
acres and percent cotton acres. Cotton producers are significantly more likely to 
prefer a return to deficiency payments and increased insurance subsidy over cat-
astrophic coverage. The percent of acres planted to corn takes the opposite sign in 
both models. A farm with a 10% higher percentage of acres planted to corn would 
be about 1.3% less likely to prefer going back to deficiency payments and 1.4% 
more likely to prefer increased insurance subsidy over increased catastrophic 
coverage. Conversely, a 10% increase in cotton acres increases the probability of 
preferring a return to deficiency payments by 2.9% and the probability of prefer-
ring insurance subsidy over catastrophic coverage by 1.2%. This dichotomy sug-
gests that the economics of these two crops are sufficiently distinct to lead to di-
vergent policy preferences. We surmise that this divergence of policy preference 
stems in part from differences in producers’ views of the U.S. markets. U.S. cot-
ton has many world competitors and makes up a relatively small share of world 
exports. Cotton producers are likely to desire the protection of deficiency pro-
grams in spite of distortionary trade effects. Conversely, U.S. corn is a large share 
of world corn exports and past experience with deficiency payments and the as-
sociated acreage set-asides may be perceived as harmful to remaining competi-
tive in world markets. 
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Conclusions and Interpretation 
This study provides insights into producer policy preferences at a time when 
much attention is being given to farm policy issues. It is unique in that crop pro-
ducers from four diverse regions are included. This permitted examination of the 
diversity of preferences that single-state studies have not allowed. 
Our results indicate that there are strong commodity effects in policy prefer-
ence, even after accounting for obvious crop differences, such as price and yield 
variability. For example, the economics of cotton and corn production appear to 
lead to strongly differing policy preferences. Further, it appears that modeling 
policy preferences in a fashion that accounts for the risks a producer faces and 
the producer’s risk preferences is fruitful. Price or yield variability was signifi-
cant in every model, and risk aversion significantly influenced three of five policy 
choices. The significance of variables quantifying risk and risk aversion suggests 
that analysis of policy preferences under the assumption of risk neutrality may 
lead to erroneous conclusions. Further, we find that producers perceive negative 
farm yield–price correlations and that these perceptions influence certain policy 
preferences. To our knowledge, this is a new finding. 
Given that policy trends of the 1990s were away from deficiency and disas-
ter payments, we can characterize several variables that are associated with fa-
voring or disfavoring this trend. Producers who have a college education reveal 
preferences that are clearly consistent with this trend. Conversely, producers who 
perceive changes in farm programs as a risk and those who recently incurred a 
below-average income show a clear preference for returning to previous farm 
policies. We believe that the below-average income year variable suggests a tran-
sitory component of policy preferences that may be strongly influenced by recent 
events. 
These findings add to our understanding of why producers of different com-
modities and regions do not always agree on preferred policy. Recognizing the 
underlying economic factors influencing farm policy preferences may provide 
guidance to finding resolution. While it is common for political leaders and var-
ious interest groups to be well versed in the economic situation of their constitu-
ents, this analysis gives perspective across regions and commodities that is sel-
dom available. 
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Endnotes 
1 This survey was conducted as part of a research project funded through a U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture risk management education initiative. 
2 Auxiliary models that exclude all responses of “not sure” were estimated, but not re-
ported, to test the influence of including these responses with those not agreeing with 
the statement. Out of 31 significant parameters in the models reported in this paper, 22 
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retained the same sign and significance. No significant parameter estimate switched to 
an opposite and significant sign. However, 9 parameters lost significance, which may 
partially be explained by a decline of about one-third in sample size. Six parameters that 
were not significant in the reported models became significant in the alternative models. 
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